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1. Introduction 
 
This paper presents a Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium model with a large number of 
distortions, where fiscal and monetary policy react to aggregate variables according to specific policy 
rules. Our objective is to analyze if and how fiscal rules that have been in place in Europe since EMU 
creation are suboptimal from a welfare perspective; also, we check the welfare properties of other rules 
that are often proposed as better solution for the conduct of fiscal policy. Our main finding is that in 
particular one of these rules - a debt-pegging tax rate - appears the be the least suboptimal 
configuration, if monetary policy response to output is not mute.  We also provide a complete welfare 
ranking of alternative fiscal rules and the economy's response to stochastic shocks under each of them. 
The policy debate on the best specification of fiscal rules has been particularly stimulated by the 
introduction of the EMU. Maastricht convergence criteria (1992) and the Stability and Growth Pact 
(1997 followed by 2005 reform)  provided the opportunity for a lively discussion among economists 
and policy makers which is still far from being settled. While the importance of maintaining sound 
public finance in order to guarantee macroeconomic stability seems to be now widely accepted, there is 
still no widespread consensus on the macroeconomic variable(s) that fiscal policy should target and the 
desirable extent of the reaction. 
Macroeconomic theory has lately devoted particular attention to the issue, making wide use of the most 
recent wave of DSGE models with nominal rigidities. Smets and Wouters (2003), Christiano et al 
(2005) and Schmitt-Grohè and Uribe (2006) are probably the reference papers of some of the most 
advanced contributions on the analysis of stabilization policies in highly distorted stochastic 
environments. Some of the above studies focused on the enrichment of the amount of real and nominal 
rigidities (like Christiano et al),  some on Bayesian estimation of structural parameters (Smets and 
Wouters) and some on welfare analysis of the policy interactions (Schmitt-Grohè and Uribe). 
However, we feel that the welfare analysis of alternative and realistic fiscal policy rules in highly 
distorted economies might still be subject to further investigation. Our ultimate driving motivation is 
the desire to build an analytical framework within which we could legitimately draw policy conclusions 
on the desiderability of different fiscal policy rules, with particular reference to the constraints 
currently in place in the European integration process. 
In order to accomplish this task, we build a model with two sources of nominal rigidities - price and 
wage adjustment costs - and three sources of real rigidities - investment adjustment costs, consumption 
habit formation and imperfect competition in product and labor markets. The fiscal authority has three 
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distortionary tax rates as policy instruments, which are set according to three alternative policy rules 
responding to different public finance aggregates: total deficit, total stock of government liabilities, and 
a linear combination of both. All the properties of the model are checked under these three alternatives 
fiscal policy specifications, in the attempt to investigate the general equilibrium and welfare effects of 
the adoption of different rules. From a technical point of view, the model is solved via an Accurate 
Second Order Solution as shown by Kim et al (2003), so to obtain appropriate welfare comparisons 
across alternative policies. We then use a measure conditional to the non-stochastic steady state in 
order to be able to capture transitional welfare effects. 
Our analysis show some remarkable results. First,  a tax rule responding to total government 
liabilities is welfare-superior to other specifications; nevertheless, monetary policy's response to output 
must not be mute, otherwise the deficit rule is preferable, since it provides a more aggressive output 
stabilization via the effect on aggregate demand.  The "mixed" feedback rule, on the other hand, seems 
to be largely suboptimal, although providing the best smoothing response after a shock. Second, within 
the liabilities rule, optimality implies a response of the tax rates on capital and labor equal, 
respectively, to 1.39 and 1.01, a result which seems robust to a wide range of stress tests; within the 
deficit rule, the optimal responses are 0.93 and zero. We interpret this result as a confirmation of the 
optimality of an "active" response to the stock of debt, whereas when fiscal policy targets deficit the 
response must be softer, in order not to boost volatility.  Third, under any specifications it seems 
optimal to tax capital income more than labor income, as the former is subject to a quantity rigidity and 
it is predetermined, whereas the latter is featured by rigidity on its own price and, given its 
differentiated nature, can be subject to increased dispersions and volatility which is welfare-damaging. 
Optimal response of the tax rate on consumption, on the other hand, seems to be rather small. 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the set-up of the model, with the separate 
characterization of the households and firms sectors, the policy environment and the steady-state. 
Section 3 deals with calibration issues, using quarterly data on the Euro area from 1958 to 2008. 
Section 4 performs the welfare analysis, looking for the utility-maximizing fiscal policy parameters 
under the three alternative feedback rules, and dealing with a careful robustness checking procedure. 
Section 5 presents the reaction of the model economy to three stochastic shocks (productivity, 
monetary policy and government expenditure), by comparing impulse response functions under 
different fiscal policy specification. Section 6 concludes and discusses possible policy implications. 
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2.The model 
 
The framework is a New Keynesian DSGE model with costly capital accumulation, imperfect 
competition, internal consumption habits, price and wage rigidities introduced via quadratic adjustment 
costs. Policy authorities conduct monetary and fiscal policies via, respectively, Taylor rule and tax rates 
responding to alternative public finance aggregates. 
Households are indexed by i ∈ 0,1.  They define their optimal plans by maximizing an intertemporal 
strongly separable utility function; they sell capital stock and their labor to intermediate firms at rate 
respectively, Zit  and Wit  ,on which they are taxed with distortionary rates  k   and  w   .They allocate 
their resulting income across consumption (Cit , taxed at rate c ),investment (It ,augmented by 
adjustment costs), and financial assets (made of interest bearing government bonds  Bit  and unfruitful 
money holding Mit ). Intermediate sector firms are indexed byj ∈ 0,1.  They operate under 
monopolistic competition, hire labor and capital by households in order to produce (subject to total 
factor productivity shock and fixed-cost shock) intermediate inputs Yjt   then used by final goods firms, 
under perfect competition, to produce a final homogenous good Yt. Monetary policy is driven by 
standard Taylor rule subject to cost-push shock, whereas the government conducts fiscal policy by 
manoeuvring the distortionary tax ratesi (with i  c,w,k ) with a feedback rule responding, 
alternatively, to total deficit, total liabilities and a linear combination of the two.  
We now proceed with the separate modelling of households, firms and policy behaviour. 
 
2.1. Households 
 
The model economy is populated by an infinite number of agents indexed on the real line between 0   
and 1 , who formulate preferences over consumption, labor efforts and money balances according to the 
following intertemporal utility function for the  ith   household: 
 
                                                       
Ui0  E0t∑
t0

uCit,Nit,Mit
                                                     (1) 
 
Functional form assumptions for the instantaneous utility function are as follows: 
 
 5
1( )
1
nn
it it
n
au N N γγ
+= − +                             
                                                                                                                                                                 (2) 
1
, 1( )( )
1
it i t
it
C C
u C
σϕ
σ
−
−−= −          
                                                                                                                                                 (3)       
 
                                                               
1
( )
1
m
it
it
m
mu M
σ
χ σ
−
= −   
                                                                                                                                                 (4)      
 
Utility depends positively on private consumption Cit  (with the parameter  0    1  determining the 
degree of internal habit persistence) and on real money balances  mit   (with  m  being the inverse of 
the elasticity of money holdings with respect to the interest rate). It depends negatively on labor supply  
Nit   (with  n   the inverse of the elasticity of work with respect to the real wage). 
Budget constraint in real terms can be expressed so to make clear the equality between total income 
(LHS) and total expenditures (RHS): 
 
                       
Yit  Rt−1 bt−1t 
mt−1t  1  tcCt  It1  ACk  ACp  ACw  bt  mt                 (5) 
 
with  Yt   being net real income stemming from ownership of production factors,  mt−1   last period real 
cash balances, and  Rt−1
b t−1
t   the gross return from last period government bonds holding  R and   are 
gross indicators of interest rate and inflation). RHS include gross consumption, gross investment, 
adjustment costs for prices and nominal wages, and accumulation of period  t   financial assets. 
Households net total income is given by: 
 
                                              Yit  1 − t
wWitNit − Tit  it  1 − tkZtKit                                     (6) 
 
with  Zt   being the rental rate of capital, Wit   the real wage of the individual supplier,  itΠ   the profits 
deriving from firms’ ownership, Tit  the lump-sum tax (transfer) to be paid (received) to (by) the 
government, and  ti   (with  i  w,k,c  ) being the tax rates on, respectively, wage and capital income, 
and consumption. 
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Adjustment costs ACi  (with  i  k,p,w   display the usual quadratic functional form, originally 
pioneered by Rotemberg (1982): 
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Equation (7), where  k   represents the adjustment scale cost for capital, indicates that one unit of 
investment  Iit   is actually transformed into one unit of capital  Kit   at the costs of  
k
2
I t
Kt
2
Iit   extra-
amount of real resources for the investor. As usual, it is important to remember that the presence of 
adjustment costs makes current investment depend on the future via the expectations mechanism and 
helps smoothing the otherwise excessively strong reaction of the real interest rate after a technological 
shock. Also, a functional form as in (7) produces positive steady-state adjustment costs1. 
In (8) and (9)  p   and  w   indicate the degree of rigidities in the adjustment of prices and wages. This 
way to rationalize nominal variables stickiness is alternative to the Calvo mechanism (Erceg et al 2000, 
Christiano et al 2003, Sbordone 2001) and to the staggered wage contracts approach (Cho and Cooley 
1995, Chari et al 2000). It is, instead, in line with contributions such Kim (2000) and Marzo (2005), 
and represents a tractable way to rationalize all the information costs associated with raising prices and 
wages above the steady-state inflation rates (respectively,  ̄   and  ̄W  , which in turn can be 
interpreted, following Woodford 2003, a measure of wage inflation). Following what has become a 
standard assumption in the literature (Christiano et al 2005, Smets and Wouters 2003), we assume the 
existence of state-contingent securities whose role is to ensure households againts variations in specific 
labor income  WitNit  . As a result, individual labor will be equal to aggregate labor income  WtNt  , and 
                                                 
1As pointed out in Kim (2000), in order to produce zero steady-state adjustment costs we would need to make them function 
of net investment, according to  
k
2
I i,k
Ki,k
−  Iit.   
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thus the marginal utility of wealth will be identical across different types of households. 
Total amount of labour supplied in the economy, in fact, is a CES aggregator of individual labor effort: 
 
                                                                 
Nt  
0
1
Nit
−1
 di

−1
                                                      (10) 
 
with    1  being the elasticity of substitution among individual different kinds of labor. As usual, we 
assume that it is  Nt   to be employed in the production of intermediate goods, which therefore require 
all types of labor. In analogy to the final good sector, the demand for differentiated labor inputs  Nit   is: 
 
                                                                     
Nit
Nt
 WitWt
−
                                                           (11) 
 
and the aggregate wage index: 
 
                                                                 
Wt  
0
1
Wit
1−di
1
1−
                                                     (12) 
 
Capital stock evolves according to the standard: 
 
                                                                 Kit  1 − Ki,t−1  Iit                                                      (13) 
 
where  0    1  is the constant depreciation rate. 
The representative household's problem is to choose the optimal combination of consumption, labor 
supply, real money holdings, government bonds, capital and investment (the vector  
Cit,Nit,mit,bit,Kit, Iit   ) taking as given the aggregate price level ( Pt  ), the aggregate wage index ( 
Wt  ) and the rental rate of capital ( Zt  ). In order to do that she maximizes (1)-(4) subject to (5)-(13) 
and the usual no-Ponzi-game borrowing condition.  The corresponding FOCs are: 
 
                                              Cit − Ci,t−1 
− − Ci,t1 − Ci,t −   t1  tc                          (14)  
                                                                                                                                                
                                                            
anNit
n   t1 − tw 1 − 1eW Wit                                        (15)                    
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m−m   t Rt − 1Rt                                                    (16) 
 
 
                                                                       
 t  Et t1Rt PtPt1                                                    (17) 
 
 
                                            
t   t 1 − tkZt  k IitKit
3
 Et11 −   
                            (18) 
 
                                                         
Ett1   t 1  32 k
Iit
Kit
2
                                            (19) 
 
where   t  and  t   are Lagrange multipliers on, respectively, households' budget constraint and capital 
accumulation equation. As usual, they indicate the price of consuming and investing in utility terms. 
Equation (14) equates the marginal utility of consumption (augmented by habit formation) to the 
Lagrange multiplier on the budget constraint (marginal cost of consuming), corrected for the 
distortionary tax rate on consumption. 
Equation (15) equates the marginal disutility of working with the utility value of net real wage. The 
term  eitW  , almost identical to Kim (1998) and Marzo (2005), denotes the elasticity of labor demand to 
the real wage, augmented by the wage adjustment costs, and it is given by the expression2: 
 
                                   
1
ew 
1
1 − w1− twNit Wt
PtWit
P t−1Wi,t−1
− ̄w PtPt−1Wi,t−1 
Et  t1 t
w
1− twNit Wt1
Pt1Wi,t1
PtWit
− ̄w Pt1Wi,t1
PtWit2
 
                         (20) 
 
With respect to the above-mentioned contributions, in our framework the elasticity  eW   is affected by 
the tax rate on wage income, which makes labor demand more rigid. 
We can check that in steady-state (or when the scale parameter  w  0, namely there are no wage 
                                                 
2Equation (20) is derived by taking account of equations (9) and (11) in the maximization for  Nit.   
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adjustment costs) the elasticity is constant at the level  . .Outside the steady-state, or in the presence 
of positive costs, wage rigidities plays a role in the optimal labor supply in equation (15), by creating a 
second wedge (the other being the distortionary tax rate w ) between the real wage and the 
labor/leisure marginal rate of substitution. 
Equation (16) equates the marginal utility of holding money with the utility costs of alternative uses of 
that additional unit of income (consumption or bond holdings); analogously, equation (17) defines 
optimal bond allocation, by equating the marginal cost of bond holding (i.e. the marginal utility of 
foregone consumption) to the marginal utility of increased consumption the next period. 
Optimal capital accumulation involves two efficiency conditions. Equation (18) states that the marginal 
utility of capital is equal to the sum of three marginal utilities: the one from the net-of-taxes rental rate (  
 t1 − tkZt  ), the one from the gain in adjustment costs ( tk
I t
Kt
3
), and the one (discounted and 
depreciated) from next period's capital (Et11 − .   
Equation (19) equates marginal benefit of investing (the discounted future marginal value of capital) 
with its marginal cost (the marginal utility of foregone consumption augmented by adjustment costs). 
 
2.2 Firms 
 
We assume the existence of a large number of intermediate firms indexed by j ∈ 0,1 , each 
producing a single variety  j  , then demanded by final good firms according to the following demand 
schedule: 
                                                                
Yjt  PjtPt
−
Yt
                                                             (21) 
 
Final good firms assemble inputs, under perfect competition, according to a Constant Elasticity of 
Substitution (CES) production function: 
                                                                 
Yt  
0
1
Yjt
−1 dj

−1
                                                        (22) 
 
with    1  being the elasticity of substitution between intermediate goods (and the price elasticity of 
demand) 
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Intermediate good firms are monopolistically competitive and therefore enjoy market power over their 
particular variety  j  ; production takes place through the following Cobb Douglas production function: 
 
                                                               
Yjt  AtKjtNjt1− −  t                                                       (23) 
 
where  Kjt  and  Njt  ,respectively, indicate the amount of capital stock and labor employed in the 
production process. Moreover, At  is a technological shock, common to all firms and  t  is a fixed cost 
shock.  The presence of  t   can be justified on the ground of a pure cost necessary to start up with the 
business, and implies increasing returns to scale.  From the technical point of view  -  as indicated by 
Kim (2000) and Christiano et al. (2001) -   t   allows to restore the zero profit condition at the steady 
state, after a proper calibration, provided that it is nonnegative. The presence of  t  obeys also to 
another principle: the need to insert shocks not directly hitting the real interest rate, which, instead, 
would respond as a second round effect to that shock. In this way, we eliminate the problem of 
interpreting changes in the real interest rate as only depending on technological shock. The evolution of  
At   and   t  is assumed to follow an AR(1) process, described as: 
 
                                                    1log (1 ) log
A
t A a t tA A Aρ ρ ε−= − + +                                          (24) 
                                                    1log (1 ) logt a t tρ ρ ε ΦΦ −Φ = − Φ + Φ +                                           (25) 
 
with  tA  N0,A2 ,  t  N0,2   . To simplify, we assume that the two production function shocks 
are uncorrelated, i.e.: A  0 .   
The presence of quadratic adjustment costs (8) injects an intertemporal dimension into the firm's 
optimization problem, which is now properly dynamic and thus requires a specific discount factor of 
future stream of profits, that we call  t.   
The  j th  intermediate firm then maximizes the future stream of nominal profits (discounted at rate   t   
and given by factor prices and adjustment costs in each period), under the technological and demand 
constraint. Formally: 
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max
Pjt
j0  E0 ∑
t0

tPtjt
                                               (26) 
where: 
                                              
Ptjt  PjtYjt − PtZtKjt − PtWtNjt − PtACjtP                                       (27) 
subject to: 
 
Yjt  AtKjtNjt1− −  t
Yjt  PjtPt
−
Yt
ACjtP 
p
2
Pjt
Pj,t−1
− ̄
2
Yt
 
 
Maximization leads to the following factor prices: 
 
                                                         
Zt  1 − 1jtY
 Yjt   tKjt
                                                    (28) 
 
                                                     
Wt  1 − 1 − 1jtY
 Yjt  yNjt
                                              (29) 
 
with  jtY   , analogously to the labor market case (20), being the output demand elasticity: 
 
                                       
1
jtY
 −1
1 − p PjtP j,t−1 − ̄
Pt
Pj,t−1
Yt
Yjt
Etp  t1 t
P j,t1
Pj,t
− ̄ Pt1Pjt
Pj,t1
Pjt
Yt1
Yjt
 
                                 (30) 
 
With perfect price flexibility p  0   or in steady-state t  t1  ̄   expression (30) simplifies 
to  jtY  ,so that the mark-up is a decreasing function of the elasticity of substitution across 
intermediate goods. In such situation, stochastic shocks do not change the mark-up, with the only 
differences being that technological or fixed-cost shocks affect real variables, whereas demand shocks 
do not.  With price stickiness, mark-up becomes a transmission channel for the business cycle, through 
its own cyclicality whose direction relies on the source of the shock (Kim 2000): production function 
shocks leading to a reduction of marginal costs increase output and the mark-up, whereas demand side 
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shocks (shifting upward the profit-maximizing equality between marginal and revenue and marginal 
costs) increase output but lead to a cut in the mark-up. 
 
2.3. Policy 
 
Monetary policy follows a standard Taylor-rule with inertia: 
                                                        
Rt
R̄
 t̄
 Yt
Ȳ
y Rt−1
R̄
 i  tMP
                                   (31) 
which in loglinearized form is: 
                                                           R̂t  ̂t  ŷt   rR̂t−1  tMP                                                (32) 
where we also allow for a  i. i.d   shock to monetary policy  tMP  0,MP2   . 
Government budget constraint in nominal terms is: 
 
                                                       Bt  Mt − Mt−1  Rt−1Bt−1  PtGt − PtTtot                                  (33) 
 
with  Mt   and  Bt   being the aggregation of individual nominal assets holdings: 
 
                                                                
Mt  ∑
i1
I
Mit, Bt  ∑
i1
I
Bit
                                               (34) 
 
 TtTOT   is the total tax revenue coming from lump-sum taxation Tt,  and taxation on consumption, and 
labor and capital income: 
 
                                                      Tt
TOT  Tt  tcCt  twWtNt  tkZtKt                                          (35) 
 
Equation (33) makes clear that each period the government covers its total deficit on the RHS (primary 
deficit  Gt − TtTOT  plus gross interest rate payments Rt−1Bt−1  ) by printing new money or by issuing 
new debt (LHS). 
As in Schmitt-Grohè and Uribe (2006), we can define total real liabilities  lt   as: 
 
 13
                                                                    lt  Rtbt  mt                                                                 (36) 
with  bt   and  mt   being, respectively, bond and money holdings in real terms. 
Therefore, in real terms, government budget constraint (33) can be written as: 
                                                 
lt  Rtt lt−1  RtGt − TtTOT − mtRt−1                                            (37) 
Primary government expenditure Gt  evolves according to: 
                                                  logGt  g logGt−1  1 − g logḠ  t
g
                                       (38) 
with 0  g  1 being the AR(1) coefficient,  Ḡ    the steady-state level,  and  Gt    i. i.d. 0,g2.   
Fiscal policy is conducted by manoeuvring the three distortionary tax rates on consumption, labor 
income and capital income  ti   with  i  c,w,k,  according to feedback policy rules responding to a 
last period fiscal aggregate  Xt−1 :  
                                                    logt
i  i logt−1  1 − ilog̄  Xt−1                                       (39) 
with  i  c,w,k   
We will try different specification of  Xt−1  : 
 
                                       
Xt−1 
di logDt−1 − logD̄
 liloglt−1 − log l̄
di logDt−1 − logD̄   liloglt−1 − log l̄
 
                            (40) 
 
(40) indicates an automatic response of the tax rate to deficit, to total liabilities, and to a linear 
combination of deficit and liabilities. Rigorously, the tax rate responds to deviation of the above 
aggregates from their steady-state level. The motivation behind the design of these alternative rules can 
be summarized as follows. The first one follows the prescription of the Stability and Growth Pact in the 
European Monetary Union, which in the short run prevents member states to overcome the 3% deficit / 
GDP ceiling, and in the medium run pushes towards balanced budget. The second rule (pegging to the 
stock of government liabilities) is the most recommended policy stance, and represents one of the 
suggestions for a further reform of EMU fiscal rules. Finally, the third one is an hybrid of the former 
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two rules, and can be considered the one leading the fiscal consolidation process of EU states during 
the run-up to the single currency in the mid-Nineties3. 
In the remaining of the paper, we will examine how the adoption of different fiscal target as in (40) 
affects the response of the economy to a variety of shocks, and which policy specification yield the 
highest level of conditional and unconditional welfare. 
 
2.4. Equilibrium and steady-state 
 
In order to make the model economy tractable, we impose ex-post symmetry on agents’ behaviour, so 
we drop all the  i and j  indexes. Furthermore, we assume equality between households and firms 
stochastic discount factors: 
                                                                     
 t1 t 
t1
t                                                               (45) 
 
As standard in the literature, we rationalize (45), which states that firms discount their future profits the 
same way household discount future consumption flows, by assuming that there is a complete and 
competitive market for contingent claims that each agents has access to. 
The final goods market is in equilibrium when total production equals total demand, augmented by 
adjustment costs: 
 
                                                        Yt  Gt  Ct  It1  ACk  ACp  ACw                                  (46) 
The capital rental market is in equilibrium when the demand for capital by intermediate goods 
producers equals the quantity supplied by households. The labor market is in equilibrium if firms’ 
demand for labor is equal to the amount of labor supplied at the wage level set by households. The 
bond market is in equilibrium when government debt is held by investors at the interest rate  Rt,  whose 
level is determined by monetary policy. The complete model can be found in  Appendix A . 
 
3. Calibration 
We calibrate the model on the Euro area economy with quarterly data  from 1958 to 2008. 
                                                 
3Maastricht convergence criteria obliged perspective member states to comply to both the deficit (3% ceiling) and the debt 
(60% of GDP) parameters. 
 
 
 15
We assume that the economy is operating in the deterministic steady-state of a competitive equilibrium 
in which the inflation rate (computed using GDP deflator) is 4.31 per cent per annum, and the nominal 
interest rate (measured by the three months interbank rate) is 5.30 per cent. The share of steady-state 
private consumption over output is 57 per cent, while for gross private investments are calibrated at 
14.5 per cent; government expenditure is determined residually using the aggregate resource constraint 
and it is found equal to 27.08 per cent of national product. Steady-state government debt is calibrated at 
60 per cent of GDP, in line with the EMU fiscal constraints. The amount of labor effort  L  0.33   is 
calibrated by using the empirically observed ratio of market activities over the total time endowment, 
equal to approximately one third. Steady-state tax rates on consumption, labor and capital are calibrated 
at, respectively, 20, 40 and 25 per cent as estimated by Forni et al (2006) for the Euro area. 
The calibration of deep parameters is summarized in Table 1: 
Table 1 
Parameter Value Description 
β  0.9961 households’ discount factor 
δ  0.025 capital depreciation rate 
α  0.33 capital share of income 
θ  6 elasticity of substitution between goods 
nγ  1.5 inverse of labor supply elasticity 
σ  2 risk adversion 
ϑ  0.7 habit formation 
mσ  10.62 utility function parameter (money) 
kφ  314 investment adjustment cost 
pφ  60 price adjustment cost 
wφ  100 wage adjustment cost 
 
The capital stock share     is set at  0. 33;   the capital/output ratio implied by the model is  
K/Y  /Z  10.44 ,very close to the value reported by Christiano 1991, equal to  10.33 ). The 
elasticity of substitution across differentiated goods is calibrated at    6,  so to generate a mark-up 
equal to 1.2; on the other hand, the elasticity of substitution among individual labor varieties is taken to 
be    12 in analogy with the value obtained in the estimation by Kim (2000). The risk adversion 
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parameter is calibrated at the standard value of    2 (Prescott 1986). The calibration of the structural 
parameter referring to the presence of money in the utility function relies on Christiano, Eichenbaum, 
and Evans (2005): we chose the parameter  m  10.62  and we use their value of money velocity 
(0.44) to calibrate the steady-state value of money to the GDP. The parameter for price adjustment  p   
has been set equal to 60 as in Ireland (2002), while an higher value has been chosen for the wage 
adjustment equation ( w  100  , so to reflect the relatively higher rigidity of labor market. 
Table 2 summarizes the calibration of stochastic moments. 
Table 2 
Parameter Value Description 
Aρ  0.95 AR(1) parameter for productivity 
Gρ  0.9 AR(1) parameter for gov.expenditure 
ρΦ  0.911 AR(1) parameter for fixed cost 
Aσ  0.07 Standard deviation of productivity innovation 
MPσ  0.03 Standard deviation of monetary policy innovation 
Gσ  0.01 Standard deviation of gov. expenditure innovation 
σΦ  0.14 Standard deviation of fixed cost innovation 
 
Fiscal policy parameters are left free to vary, whereas for monetary policy we use in the benchmark the 
standard parameters configuration (   1.2,y  0.5 ), but we vary them considerably when dealing 
with robustness analysis. 
 
4. Welfare analysis 
 
In this section we perform policy evaluations by computing the welfare cost of different specifications 
of the fiscal rules and, within each of them, different values of the feedback coefficient relating tax 
rates and fiscal aggregates. In order to do so (following contributions such as Schmitt-Grohé-Uribe 
2006 and Marzo 2005) we solve the full model up to second order approximation of the policy 
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function, and use it in the calculation of the second order expansion of the utility function around the 
deterministic steady-state. After that, we compute the welfare costs associated with the adoption of a 
particular fiscal policy rule, with respect to the second-order approximation of the utility function at the 
steady-state. Welfare costs are computed in terms of fraction of consumption that a household has to 
give up in order to attain the same welfare under alternative policy regimes. 
In particular, we look for policy parameters that minimize the difference  EVSS  − EVF  , where: 
                                                     ( )0
0
, ,SS t SS SS SS
t
E V E u C L Mβ∞
=
⎡ ⎤ =⎣ ⎦ ∑                                          (47) 
                                                    ( )0
0
, ,
i i i iF t F F F
t
E V E u C L Mβ∞
=
⎡ ⎤ =⎣ ⎦ ∑                                        (48) 
 
Equation (47) refers to the second order approximation of the utility function calculated at the steady-
state, whereas equation (48) indicates the same measure under a specific fiscal policy regime  Fi   with  
i   indicating one of the three fiscal policy rules. 
As standard now, we define     as the fraction of consumption that a household has to give up to 
maintain the same second-order welfare as in the steady-state, when the economy adopts a particular 
fiscal policy regime  Fi.  Formally: 
 
                                               
E VFi  E0 ∑
t0

tu1 − 1 − CSS ,LSS ,MSS   
                         (49) 
Considering the functional form adopted, we can derive an analytical expression for    as in Schmitt-
Grohé and Uribe (2006): 
 
                                               
  1 − 1 − V
Fi  1 − −1
1 − VSS  1 − −1
1
1−
                                     (50) 
 
Welfare costs, measuring the percentage of consumption needed in order to switch from steady-state 
configuration to a given policy regime  Fi   is then given by: 
 
 18
    100  
The following table reports the optimal fiscal policy based on conditional welfare measure under the 
three alternative fiscal regimes. The results have been obtained after a grid search within the interval  
−2,2  for each fiscal policy parameter, and with the following specification of monetary policy 
parameters   1.2,y  0.5, r  0.7. Under all the following experiments, consumption tax rate's 
response will be kept at a conventional value of  0.3 , which has been found to be optimal in that 
respect. 
Table 3 
Fiscal target kDφ  LDφ Klφ  Llφ  ω  
liabilities - - 1.39 1.01 -9.0369 
deficit 0.93 0 - - -10.9841
both  0.85 0 0.95 0 -203.89 
 
 
What Table 3 tells us is that under standard monetary policy with a considerable degree of inertia, the 
optimal fiscal policy is the one where both tax rates on capital and labor respond more than 
proportionally to the total stock of government liabilities. Under the deficit rule, optimal fiscal policy 
responds less than proportionally with the capital tax instrument, and does not respond with the labor 
tax. No taxation on labor is confirmed in the "mixed" rule, which delivers a heavier response on the 
liabilities side, but nonetheless is much less suboptimal that the previous two. 
We now ask ourselves whether the above results are robust to alternative monetary policy 
specifications. Table 4 shows the robustness of the above results (relative to the debt and deficit rule) 
under different monetary policies. The first three columns indicate the monetary stance towards 
inflation, output and lagged interest rate; the fourth and fifth columns report the corresponding optimal 
feedback parameter for the liabilities rule, with the relative welfare cost ( lω ). The last columns show 
the corresponding feedback parameters (to capital and labor income) under deficit targeting, with the 
corresponding costs ( dω ). 
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Table 4 
πφ  yφ  rφ  Klφ  Llφ  lω  Kdφ  Ldφ dω  
0.7 0  0 1.37 1.03 −64.5829 0.93 0 −13.3424 
0.7 0.5 0 1.38 1.01 −9.0251 0.93 0 −12.5625 
0.7 0.5 0.7 1.39 1.01 −9.0369 0.93 0 −11.4355 
0.7 0  0.7 1.39 1.01 −85.355 0.93 0 −13.8459 
1.2 0  0 1.37 1.02 −64.76 0.93 0 −10.9841 
1.2 0.5 0 1.38 1.01 −9.0251 0.93 0 −10.9945 
1.2 0  0.7 1.39 1.01 −85.35 0.93 0 −11.0862 
3 0  0 1.37 1.02 −64.76 0.93 0 −10.9841 
3 0  0.7 1.39 1.01 −85.35 0.93 0 −11.0013 
3 0  0.7 1.39 1.01 −85.35 0.93 0 −11.5623 
3 0.5 0.7 1.39 1.01 −9.03 0.93 0 −12.4111 
3 0.5 0 1.38 1.01 −9.02 0.93 0 −10.9841 
10 0  0 1.37 1.02 −64.76 0.93 0 −10.9841 
10 0  0.7 1.39 1.01 −85.35 0.93 0 −10.9841 
 
 
Therefore, the fiscal rule on debt is preferable to the one on deficit only if the monetary policy's 
response to output is not mute. We believe that the interpretation of this crucial result lies in the high 
degree of distortions in our model economy. A fiscal rule on debt is optimal because of its stabilizing 
properties, but given the number of imperfections an active output stabilization role is also needed from 
the monetary policy arm. Otherwise, the fiscal rule on debt is not enough to offset the inflationary 
pressures coming from output distortions, and then it is more desirable to switch towards an aggressive 
response to deficit (a flow rather than a stock variable, and therefore potentially causling more 
volatility). In that case, however, the optimal coefficients are smaller. Given the more aggressive nature 
of a fiscal rule on deficit, feedback coefficients must be lower (dK  0.93 and dL  0 ), in order not 
too boost volatility; in particular, labor tax response should be zero. Note that under the deficit rule the 
conditional welfare loss is much less dependant on the monetary policy stance, as the fiscal rule 
provides the highest possible contribution to fight inflation. 
The last result to comment is the higher value of the feedback coefficients (under all types of fiscal 
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rules) on capital relative to the ones on labor income. This stems from the fact that capital is pre-
determined and subject to quantity rigidities, whereas labor has price rigidities. 
 
5. Response to shocks 
 
In this section we present the response of the model economy to different shocks originating from three 
alternative sources: productivity, fiscal and monetary sides. Impulse response functions are computed 
under the three alternative fiscal policy rules, and are shown in Appendix B.  As it can be seen, the 
stabilizing properties of a debt-pegging tax rule are confirmed, as response to shocks is smoother under 
that particular specification. 
 
 
 
 
 
6. Conclusions 
 
This paper presented a New Keynesian Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium model featured by a 
considerable number of nominal and real rigidities. Our main goal was to investigate the behaviour of 
the economy - in terms of reaction to stochastic shocks and welfare analysis - under three alternative 
fiscal policy rules defining the response of the three distortionary tax rates (on consumption, wage and 
capital income) to - respectively-  total government liabilities, total deficit and a linear combination of 
the two fiscal aggregates. 
Our results can be summarized as follows: 
- a fiscal rule where the main policy instruments are tax rates on labor and capital income responding to 
the past stock of real liabilities is the best configuration from a welfare point of view. Taxation on 
consumption should be kept rather small, and the feedback coefficient on labor and capital tax should 
be, respectively, 1.01 and 1.39. Fiscal rules responding to deficit and, to a greater extent, to a linear 
combination of fiscal aggregates, are welfare inferior. 
- the above welfare ranking is conditional on monetary policy's response to output not being mute, 
otherwise the fiscal rule responding to deficit becomes the optimal one. 
- all the configurations deliver the same result in terms of the relative burden of taxation, which should 
be on capital more than on labor. 
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- a fiscal rule targeting the stock of real liabilities seems to result in the best smoothing response after a 
shock. 
From a policy point of view, this paper seems to strengthen the position calling for a greater emphasis 
of EMU fiscal rules on public debt stabilization, provided that monetary policy does not give up on 
output stabilization. The strong suboptimality of SGP-like fiscal rule is no doubt a strong conclusion;  
nevertheless, we should maybe remember that the main economic rationale of the SGP has never been 
the choice of a welfare maximizing fiscal stance. Instead, EMU fiscal rules have been designed in order 
to prevent the arising of negative externalities which would damage the correct functioning of a 
monetary union. If and when the European integration process heads towards a more centralized fiscal 
framework that can overcome the need of national fiscal policies’ coordination, then maybe the 
conduct of fiscal policy can more legitimately focus on rules that seem to have a better welfare 
enhancing perspective.   
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Appendix A :Model equations 
 
Cit − bCi,t−1 − − bCi,t1 − bCi,t −   t1  tc  
 
 
anNit
n   t1 − tw 1 − 1eW Wit  
 
 
Zt  1 − 1jtY
 Yjt   tKjt
 
 
 
Wt
Pt
 1 − 1 − 1jtY
 Yjt  yNjt
 
 
 
Yjt  AtKjtNjt1− −  t  
 
 
lt  Rtbt  mt  
 
 
TtTOT  −Ttls  tcCt  tw WtPt Nt  t
kZtKt
 
 
 
Rt
R̄
 t̄
 Yt
Ȳ
y Rt−1
R̄
 i  tMP
 
 
 
logAt  1 − a logĀ  a logAt−1  tA  
 
 
log t  1 −  log̄   log t−1  t  
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logGt  g logGt−1  1 − g logḠ  tg  
 
 
logTtLS  1 − ls logTLS  LS logTt−1LS  tLS  
 
 
bt  mt − Rt−1t bt−1 −
mt−1t  Ct  It1  ACk  TtTOT  ACw  ACp − Y  
 
 
Kit  1 − Ki,t−1  Iit  
 
 
logtC  C logt−1  1 − Clog̄C  Cloglt−1 − log l̄  
 
 
logtK  K logt−1  1 − Klog̄K  Kloglt−1 − log l̄  
 
 
logtW  W logt−1  1 − Wlog̄W  Wloglt−1 − log l̄  
 
 
Dt  Rt−1Bt−1  G − Ttot  
 
 
lt  Rtt lt−1  RtGt − TtTOT − mtRt − 1  
 
 
m−   t1t   t  
 
 
1
jtY
 −1
1 − p PjtP j,t−1 − ̄
Pt
Pj,t−1
Yt
Yjt
Etp  t1 t
P j,t1
Pj,t
− ̄ Pt1Pjt
P j,t1
Pjt
Yt1
Yjt
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1
ew 
1
1 − w1− twNit Wt
PtWit
Pt−1Wi,t−1
− ̄w PtPt−1Wi,t−1 
Et  t1 t
w
1− twNit Wt1
Pt1Wi,t1
PtWit
− ̄w Pt1Wi,t1
PtWit2  
 
 
 
Ett1   t 1  32 k
Iit
Kit
2
 
 
 
t   t 1 − tkZt  k IitKit
3
 Et11 − 
 
 
 
 
 t  Et t1Rt PtPt1  
 
 
 
Appendix B : Impulse Response Function 
 
The following three tables report the impulse response function under the following stochastic shocks: 
- productivity 
- monetary policy  
- fiscal policy 
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